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Abstract
The ability to decode an individual’s intentions in real time has long been a ‘holy grail’ of research on human volition. For
example, a reliable method could be used to improve scientific study of voluntary action by allowing external probe stimuli
to be delivered at different moments during development of intention and action. Several Brain Computer Interface
applications have used motor imagery of repetitive actions to achieve this goal. These systems are relatively successful, but
only if the intention is sustained over a period of several seconds; much longer than the timescales identified in
psychophysiological studies for normal preparation for voluntary action. We have used a combination of sensorimotor
rhythms and motor imagery training to decode intentions in a single-trial cued-response paradigm similar to those used in
human and non-human primate motor control research. Decoding accuracy of over 0.83 was achieved with twelve
participants. With this approach, we could decode intentions to move the left or right hand at sub-second timescales, both
for instructed choices instructed by an external stimulus and for free choices generated intentionally by the participant. The
implications for volition are considered.
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Introduction
Decoding an individual’s intentions is the central aim of brain-
computer interfacing (BCI) [1]. Successful BCIs would allow those
who lack more efficient modes of communication to interact with
their surrounding environment [1], with the promise of major
improvements in Quality of Life. In addition, BCIs could provide
important scientific insights about the mechanisms of human
intentional action. In particular, the ability to decode intentions
would strongly enhance the scientific armamentarium used to
investigate volition. Current research on volition suffers from an
inability to manipulate the input to the voluntary motor system.
Most studies have been limited to asking participants to choose,
freely but arbitrarily, among a set of equivalent actions, and simply
measuring the neural correlates of such ‘internally-generated’
action choice [2].
Decoding intention in real time would open the door to
interesting experimental possibilities, such as interventions to
facilitate/frustrate intentions, and intention-contigent stimulation.
An indication of the scientific interest in intention decoding comes
from the mythical status of the ‘Grey Walter experiment’. The
philosopher Daniel Dennett recounts [3] Grey Walter’s presenta-
tion, at an undergraduate medical society in Oxford University, of
the following experiment, performed around 1963. Patients with
implanted epicortical electrodes viewed a slide show by pressing an
‘advance button’. Grey Walter was able to use intracortical
readiness potentials to decode the intention to press the button,
and use this as the signal to advance the slideshow. The patients
apparently experienced a level of surprise when what they had
been about to make happen happened ‘‘as if by magic’’, but the
experiment was never fully published, and a systematic decode-
and-intervene study of human intention still remains to be
performed half a century later.
Three main neural correlates have been used for decoding
intention in the BCI engineering literature. These are steady-state
visually evoked potentials (SSVEPs), event-related potentials
(ERPs) and sensorimotor rhythms (SMR) [1]. SSVEP-based BCIs
rely on flickering visual stimuli that, when foveated, produce EEG
oscillations at the stimulation frequency, over the visual cortex.
These BCIs achieve high accuracy, but are unsuitable for probing
intentions since they rely on the relatively weak attentional
modulation of automatic visual processing of an external stimulus.
This process is quite unlike normal motor intention, which is often
defined by the absence of any external stimulus corresponding to
the action. ERP-based BCIs detect specific evoked EEG compo-
nents. The most successful of these is the P3-based BCI [4–6]. The
P3 is a late event-related EEG component that is modulated by
attention, even in the absence of overt motor responses [7]. P3-
based BCIs typically present an array of stimuli, and request
participants to attend to the stimulus corresponding to their
intention. This induces an increase in P3 amplitude for the
corresponding stimulus. Detecting the P3 allows the corresponding
action to be performed by an artificial agent.
SMR BCIs generally rely on the oscillatory ‘‘m-rhythm’’
modulation observed over the motor cortex during motor
execution and imagery. A decrease in the bandpower relative to
an appropriate baseline period is referred to as event-related
desynchronisation (ERD), while an increase is referred to as event-
related synchronisation (ERS) [8]. m-ERD is observed during
motor preparation in the contralateral hemisphere to the hand
about to move. Motor preparation, motor execution, motor
imagery, and even observation of another’s actions, all lead to
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decreases in m-band EEG power [9–11]. Other BCIs have been
based on event-related desynchronisation in the b EEG band (b-
ERD). b-ERD is a pronounced decrease in EEG power around
15–25 Hz over the motor cortex contralateral to the hand that will
move or is imagined to move. b-ERS is a rebound in 15–25 Hz
power, often observed immediately after motor execution. m-
rhythm and b-ERD are thought to be robust and intrinsic signals
related to intentional motor activation in the brain. SMR BCIs
have the lowest accuracy of the three methods described [12].
However, they have the highest ecological validity as paradigms
for scientific study of intentional action, because they alone rely on
neural correlates closely linked to motor intention. Other ERPs
that are often associated with motor intention, CNV, RP and LRP
have also been reported. However, the signal-to-noise ratio of
these potentials is quite low, and performance of the resulting BCIs
has generally been worse than using the sensorimotor rhythms
[13,14].
Therefore, SMR-based BCIs seem particularly appropriate for
the scientific study of volition. Most such BCIs rely on detecting
changes in sensorimotor EEG oscillations during repetitive real or
imagined movements, carried out over a period of several seconds
[15,16]. For example, the BCI user would decide to move their
right hand, and would continuously imagine moving the right
hand until the BCI detected m-ERD over the left motor cortex,
and triggered the corresponding action of the robot, or other
artificial agent, at which point the user could cease their motor
imagery. The technical details of the BCI effectively transform
intention into a continuous feedback-driven effort to control the
external device. In contrast, human intentional decisions often
seem rapid, changeable, and even phenomenally thin [17]. Thus,
to study the processes underlying normal volition, we needed a
protocol that would allow us to detect intention to move at the
reduced timescales of normal sensorimotor action, and in a single-
trial setting.
A standard method for investigating the development of
intentions has been the precueing task. In this task, a directional
precue is first presented, indicating whether the participant should
prepare a movement of their left or right hand. After an
appropriate delay, often around 1 s, an imperative cue, or Go
signal, instructs the participant to make the action they have
prepared. The participant simply prepares the action based on the
information gleaned from the direction cue and executes the
action at the onset of the imperative/go cue. The degree of
preparation, or strength of intention, can be estimated from
psychophysiological signals, such as the presence of CNV and m-
ERD/ERS during the foreperiod between the precue and the Go
cue, or by low reaction times to the Go cue. Numerous human and
animal studies confirm that intentions to move the left and right
hand are developed, and can be changed dynamically by external
intervention, during this interval [17,18].
Most intention decoding studies rely on the model being trained
and tested on data collected from participants carrying out the
same task. We were interested in whether the model trained
during repetitive finger execution/imagination could also be used
to decode intention at the sensorimotor timescales of the precueing
task. Finally, we wanted to see whether free choices can be
decoded as successfully and as early as instructed choices.
A common issue with motor-related BCI is their accuracy and
applicability to the general population. The senorimotor m rhythm
during real and imagined motor execution is highly variable, both
within and between individuals [9,19]. Therefore, our study of
intention decoding, like other studies [20] used only participants
who showed modulation of the m and/or b frequencies during the
training task. We discuss exclusions and the limitations that they
imply later.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Twenty healthy volunteers (six male) participated in the study,
all were right handed and between the ages of 19 to 30 (mean age
23). The protocol was approved by the UCL ethics committee,
and all subjects gave their written informed consent for the study.
All participants first performed a simple repetitive motor execution
task (finger tapping). The purpose of this task was to select
participants suitable for the BCI experiments. Five participants
were excluded at this stage because of EOG and EMG artifacts.
Three further participants failed to show any modulation of the m/
b rhythms over the motor cortex related to action execution, so
could not be used for motor based BCI. The remaining twelve all
showed some modulation of m and/or b rhythms during execution
of the right and/or left finger movement, and were included in the
main BCI experiment.
Experimental protocol
Subjects were seated in a chair at a distance of 80 cm from an
LCD screen. Both hands were resting on a keyboard. They were
told to remain relaxed, and try to minimise movement and eye
blinks. When required to respond, they were told to simply use
their index fingers and try to avoid tensing their arms or shoulders.
The whole experiment consisted of two model-training sessions
and a final testing session. Each session lasted 30–40 minutes with
10–15 minute breaks between sessions. The duration of the whole
experiment, including setup, was kept below 3 hours to minimise
fatigue.
Session 1. The first model-training session was designed to
identify EEG signals related to motor execution. Participants were
instructed to tap with their right or left index finger at a rate of
2 Hz. They were encouraged to minimise all other movement and
to only use the designated index fingers. 50–75 trials were
collected for each hand.
Session 2. The second session aimed to show that a decoding
model based on actual motor execution, derived from the first
session, could be used to decode EEG activity in the absence of
execution. Participants were instructed to carry out motor imagery
of the repetitive finger movement instructed in session 1. All other
aspects of the task were as in session 1. This session also allowed us
to screen participants for presence of motor-related EEG
oscillations, and at least minimal voluntary control over these
oscillations.
Session 3. In the final session, participants performed a rapid
precued, delayed-response task, based on similar tasks in the
human motor control literature. Participants were simply
instructed to prepare the action indicated by the precue, and to
respond as quickly as possible to the imperative stimulus when it
appeared. The model trained with the data from the first two
sessions could be used to make sample-by-sample predictions of
the participant’s choice in the delayed response task. The motor
task carried out by the subjects, was not the same across the three
sessions, but we assumed a common psychological element with a
neural correlate present in all tasks. Thus, our BCI decoding
would be based on some internal process common to execution
(session 1), imagery (session 2), and preparation (session 3) of left or
right responses. The existence of such a common element of motor
representation is well-established [21], and can be clearly linked to
the activity of contralteral motor cortical regions, notably the
premotor and motor cortices. We therefore had physiological
Decoding Intention at Sensorimotor Timescales
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evidence that all sessions should involve a common process of
modulation of motor cortical EEG oscillations.
Visual protocols
The first calibration session can be seen in figure 1. An annulus
subtending 2.25 degrees of visual angle appeared at the centre of
the screen. After a brief interval, an arrow appeared at the centre
of the screen instructing the participant which index finger to use
on that trial. The annulus turned progressively red along a
clockwise manner, rotating at 90 degrees/s for 500 ms, at which
point it turned orange, indicating that participants should begin
repetitive finger movement (but without depressing the response
key) at a rate of around 2 Hz. After a further 3.5 seconds the
annulus and central arrow turned green. The participant was
required to respond within 1 s using the same finger they were
tapping during the intervening orange phase. The data during the
orange phase was used to train the initial BCI model, which could
be used for decoding motor imagery during the second session.
The visual protocol for the second session was very similar.
After the initial preparation phase the arrow at the centre of the
screen changed to a crosshair. The position of the crosshair was
updated based on the model output. The position of the crosshair
was updated every 17 ms although the model output was
calculated every 8 ms. The participant was instructed to use
continuous motor imagery to imagine repetitively tapping their left
or right index finger (as they had actually done in session 1),
according to the arrow direction on that trial. They were
instructed not to move their fingers, and this was monitored
visually by the experimenter. The participants were rewarded for
maintaining the crosshair on or beyond the desired edge of the
annulus. For every 8 ms that the crosshair was placed beyond the
desired border the participant was rewarded with 0.00014, so if
the participant managed to maintain the crosshair beyond the
desired border then they would earn an extra 0.062 in that trial.
Once the annulus turned green they again pressed the response
key, within 1 s.
The final protocol (see figure 1) involved a simple precued
delayed response task. Participants were initially shown a fixation
cross. After 500 ms, an arrow appeared at the centre of the screen
for 400 ms, and then disappeared. The arrow could point either
right or left. After a delay period, a Go cue (green square)
appeared. Crucially, the interval between directional precue offset
and go cue was unpredictably jittered to be between 0.3 and 1.4 s.
This jitter encouraged the participants to immediately prepare the
designated action, and to maintain this preaparation throughout
the delay period, since the Go signal could occur at any time.
Participants were instructed to react as quickly as possible to the
Go signal. Participants were also rewarded (£1) if their mean
reaction time, based on a block of 40 trials, decreased relative to
the preceding block of trials. Six participants also carried out a
free-choice condition.
In the free-choice condition, they were asked to decide for
themselves whether to use the hand instructed by the arrow, or to
ignore the instruction and use the other hand. They were asked to
make this choice anew when the arrow appeared at the start of
each trial, and to try to roughly balance follow and ignore
decisions across the block. This protocol was based on paradigms
involving voluntary saccade countermanding. They were again
rewarded for fast reaction times. In total, for the delayed response
task, the participants carried out at least 240 trials.
Data acquisition
EEG was measured from 27 electrodes according to the
international 10-10 system, mounted in a cap. The electrode
Figure 1. The three protocols used. (far left) Participant carried out real repetitive movements. (centre) Participant carried out repetitive motor
imagery and received online feedback. (far right) Simple precueing task where the participant simply reacted as quickly as possible.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085100.g001
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montage aimed to maximally cover the motor cortices in each
cerebral hemisphere, and was based on a grid extending
anterioposteriorly and laterally from FT7 to TP8. Horizontal
and vertical electroculogram (EOG) was measured with bipolar
recording. EMG was recorded from bipolar electrodes placed in a
belly-tendon montage over the first dorsal interosseus muscle of
both hands. For nine of the twelve participants EMG was only
recorded on subjects during the precueing task. For the remaining
three EMG was recorded during the whole experiment. Signals
from all channels were amplified (g.tec GmgH, Schiedlberg,
Austria), filtered (0.1–40 Hz), and digitized (sampling frequency,
128 Hz). The PC carrying out the acquisition also carried out the
preprocessing, and during the feedback session, the execution of
the BCI model. The visual stimulus display was controlled by a
second computer, to ensure accurate timing. Acquisition and
model execution were carried out in the Simulink environment.
The visual paradigm was written in Python using OpenGl.
Training the model
The methods used were based on those used for standard motor
imagery BCI paradigms [22]. The methods rely on spatial
filtering, choosing the optimal time window and frequency bands,
and finally training a linear model.
Spatial filtering. Spatial filtering is an important part of
detecting neuromodulatory changes over the motor cortex [23].
The most widely used and successful method of discriminating
such changes has been Common Spatial Patterns (CSP). The CSP
approach finds a spatial weighting of the sensors (‘‘spatial filters’’)
that maximize the variance of the signal in specific EEG bands in
one condition while minimizing the variance of the signal of
another condition [24]. The variance of a bandpassed signal is
equivalent to the band power. Therefore, CSP filters can be used
to discriminate conditions that are characterised by high power
(ERS) for left hand responses and low power (ERD) for right hand
responses, from conditions with the reverse pattern. They are thus
effective in decoding intentions to move the left or right hand.
Temporal Window selection. A 3.5 second epoch was
extracted from the repetitive real and imaginary finger movement
conditions used for training. It is assumed that motor execution
and motor imagery rely on a common set of mechanisms which
underly motor cognition [25]. Furthermore, in [15] it was reported
that a model trained on real movement was successfully used to
provide feedback during imagined movement. Throughout the
literature there is an accumulation of evidence that motor imagery
and motor execution share many common features. A subsection
of this epoch was determined manually in order to maximise
decoding performance for each subject. The period was on
average a second long (SD=0.2 s) and started at least 500 ms after
the initiation of the repetitive real/imagined movement. We
assumed that this optimal period corresponded to the strongest
motor related neural correlates, and that it would provide us with
the optimal features for our precueing task.
Spectral filtering. The two EEG bands usually associated
with motor execution are the m (8–14) and b (15–25). The optimal
frequency range for decoding was determined for each partici-
pant’s training data [23].
Linear model. Simple LDA (Linear Discriminant Analysis)
was used, which has been used in the past to good effect
[13,22,26]. An LDA is a linear classifier which attempts to find a
linear combination of features that separate two classes. So in our
tasks it seeks to find a weighting of the log bandpower from the
defined spatial sources that would allow it to classify the neural
activity as belonging to a right or left hand button press.
The procedure implemented to train the model is similar to the
one outlined in [23]. The data from the actual movement and
motor imagery sessions was combined. First, the optimal
frequencies are determined then, using the filtered data, the
optimal time window is found. Each electrode is spatially filtered
using a surface Laplacian, then average plots of the spectra in each
condition are calculated from the onset of the orange ‘prepare’
cue, to the onset of the go cue. The classwise spectral plots for each
channel, as well as their respective squared point biserial
correlation coefficients, are used to choose the optimal spectral
windows. Then, using the filtered data, the average classwise
bandpower plots are used to find the optimal time window. From
the filtered data, 27 spatial filters are extracted. From these spatial
filters the best four are selected based on eigenvalue magnitude
and biological plausibility (e.g., involvement of cortex contralateral
to the movement). The EEG data from the 27 channels is spatially
filtered into the 4 signals corresponding to the 4 retained filters.
The log-variance is taken from each trial of the training data. The
resulting feature vector is the same size as the number of spatial
filters used. A simple linear classifier is then trained on the
calibration data.
Classifying the delayed response data
When decoding intentions in real-time, it is important to
balance accuracy of decoding against speed of intention detection.
A conservative decoding approach will require considerable
evidence before predicting the intention. Conservative decoding
will therefore tend to be more accurate, but detect intention onsets
later. In our precued delayed response task, the conservative
approach would therefore decode intentions accurately, but closer
to the time of actual movement exeuction. This trade-off is
apparent when choosing the width of the EEG window used for
decoding intentions. Using larger windows would be more
accurate but slow, whereas smaller windows would react quicker,
allowing us to identify the first onset of direction intention rapidly,
but at the expense of accuracy. We therefore compared three
different window widths: 500 ms 300 ms and 100 ms. The data
was spectrally and spatially filtered using the parameters deter-
mined from each participant’s training data. The log-variance of
the data was then passed to the linear model, which produced a
continuous score. The output of the model was thus a continuous
value along a dimension, whose extremes corresponded to the left
and right index finger movements learned during training. The
models ability to classify the data was assessed using the area under
the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC AUC). This is
equivalent to a d9 sensitivity measure for detecting the intention to
move one hand rather than the other [27].
Results
Decoding instructed choice (Instructed)
The model was trained on each participant’s real and imaginary
movement data, then tested on the precued delayed-response task.
The model could decode intentions with good accuracy
(AUCw0.83) during the interval between an instruction precue
and a Go stimulus of the precueing task. The results are shown in
figure 2, time-locked to the direction cue. Several points arise from
this figure. First, decoding accuracy begins to rise with 200–
400 ms of the directional precue. The short initial delay
presumably reflects the time required to visually encode the
directional arrow. Second, decoding accuracy rises earlier for
shorter decoding windows, as might be expected. In our task, the
earliest possible timing of the Go signal was 700 ms after the onset
of the directional precue. By this time, decoding accuracy is
Decoding Intention at Sensorimotor Timescales
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already high. Data beyond this point is based on progressively
smaller number of trials, as the distribution of delay periods was
uniform random between 700 and 1800 ms. Decoding accuracy
continues to improve during the remaining delay period. This
could reflect an increase in preparation: as each moment passes
without a Go signal, the participant can be more confident that a
Go signal will shortly occur, justifying a greater effort towards
preparation.
The data are replotted aligned to the Go cue in figure 3. This
presentation is similar to a response-locked average such as a
Readiness Potential. The vertical dashed line indicates the onset of
the Go cue with the right edge of the shaded aread indicating the
latest possible timing of the directional precue. Decoding accuracy
increases monotonically and linearly up until the time of action.
To confirm that the decoding was based on brain preparation,
and not contaminated by signals related to motor execution, we
also analysed the EMG data in the precueing task. We compared
the time course of intention decoding using EEG and EMG
signals. Figure 4 shows that decoding based on EMG signals
becomes possible only after the Go signal, whereas decoding based
on EEG is possible during the delay period between precue and
Go signal. We conclude that decoding based on sensorimotor
rhythms (figures 2 and 3) corresponds to intention and preparation
for movement, but not to actual movement itself.
For three participants we also recorded EMG during the real
and imaginary movement tasks. Figure 5 compares the decoding
of movement intention during movement imagery in these
participants, based on both EEG and EMG. Figure 6 shows
decoding during the foreperiod between precue and Go signal in
the precueing task, for the same participants. In both cases,
classification achieved using EEG far exceeds that of using EMG.
In figure 6, decoding using EEG rises earlier than the decoding
using EMG and that at the onset of the Go signal decoding using
EMG is very poor. With this we conclude that the model depends
on the neuromodulation of the sensorimotor EEG rhythms
associated with motor preparation, rather than motor execution.
We next investigated whether a BCI model trained on real and
imagined finger movement would provide better decoding during
the delay-period of the precueing task, rather than simply using the
EEG signals during the delay period, without such prior training.
We therefore compared the results using our real and imagined
movement training method with a training method confined to the
precueing task. For this, we trained the decoding model with one
subset of precueing task data, and tested on another subset, using
10 fold crossvalidation. Prior training with execution and imagery
gave a modestly but significantly better decoding accuracy
(M=0.83, SD=0.08) than decoding based only on precueing
data (M=0.76, SD=0.09): (t(11) = 3.61 pv0.005). To investigate
the specificity of our CSP approach, we compared our results with
an alternative algorithm based on simple surface Laplacian spatial
filtering [28,29]. We found the CSP method (M=0.83, SD=0.08)
produced modestly but significantly (t(11) = 4.2, pv0.002) better
results than the surface Laplacian spatial filtering (M=0.79,
SD=0.08), which is in agreement with other studies [23,24,30].
We next investigated whether using a BCI model trained on real
and imagined finger movement provides better decoding during
the precued delay-period itself than simply using the EEG during
the delay period itself. We therefore compared the results using
our training method to simply training the model with one subset
of precueing task data, and testing on another subset, using 10 fold
crossvalidation. Prior training with execution and imagery gave
better decoding accuracy (M=0.83, SD=0.08) than simply using
the precueing data (M=0.76, SD=0.09): (t(11) = 3.61 pv0.005).
To investigate the specificity of our CSP approach, we compared
our results with an alternative algorithm based on simple surface
Laplacian spatial filtering [28,29]. We found the CSP method
(M=0.83, SD=0.08) produced significantly (t(11) = 4.2,
pv0.002) better results than the surface Laplacian spatial filtering
Figure 2. ROC AUC of model trained on real and imaginary movement data and tested on precue data. Aligned to direction cue and
using three different window widths (500 ms, 300 ms and 100 ms). The black line shows the decoding accuracy achieved when condition labels were
randomly reshuffled.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085100.g002
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(M=0.79, SD=0.08), which is in agreement with other publica-
tions [23,24,30].
Free vs Instructed
The ultimate goal of a BCI is to decode internal signals
corresponding to an endogenous intention, and not merely to an
external instruction. Six of the twelve participants also performed
Figure 3. ROC AUC of model trained on real and imaginary movement data and tested on precue data. Aligned to Go cue and using
three different window widths (500 ms, 300 ms and 100 ms). The black line shows the decoding accuracy achieved when condition labels were
randomly reshuffled.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085100.g003
Figure 4. Comparison of decoding using EEG and EMG, when aligned to Go cue. The black line shows the decoding accuracy achieved
when condition labels were randomly reshuffled.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085100.g004
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in a condition in which they freely chose which button to press.
The directional precue was always shown, and participants were
instructed to choose voluntarily either to follow or countermand it.
The same model was used to decode the free and instructed
decisions. Figures 7 and 8 show decoding accuracy plots for
instructed and free choices. The two traces are broadly similar in
form, but the free choice data shows some interesting features.
First, decoding accuracy begins to rise slightly earlier for free
choices compared to instructed choices. To investigate this point
statistically, a piecewise linear model was fitted to the free and
instructed AUC results of each participant, and the time points of
the slope change were compared using a paired t-test. The onset of
Figure 5. Comparison of decoding using EEG and EMG during imaginary movement task for the last three participants. The black line
shows the decoding accuracy achieved when condition labels were randomly reshuffled.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085100.g005
Figure 6. Comparison of decoding using EEG and EMG for the last three participants, when aligned to Go cue. The black line shows the
decoding accuracy achieved when condition labels were randomly reshuffled.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085100.g006
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intention, as indicated by this method, did not differ significantly
between conditions (Free (M=0.43 s after precue, SD=0.15 s):
Instructed (M=0.52 s, SD=0.12 s): t(5) = 1.23, pw0.27).
Second, decoding accuracy for free choices did not reach as
high a level as for instructed choices (see figure 7). We compared
decoding accuracy between conditions at the onset of the go cue,
since this is logically the key point for decoding sensorimotor
intentions. The difference between conditions was significant
(instructed (M=0.82, SD=0.06): free (M=0.75, SD=0.05):
t(5) = 2.85, pv0.04). This difference could potentially reflect
Figure 7. ROC AUC of Free and Instructed choices. Aligned to Go cue using a 300 ms window. The black line shows the decoding accuracy
achieved when condition labels were randomly reshuffled.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085100.g007
Figure 8. ROC AUC of Free and Instructed choices. Aligned to direction cue using a 300 ms window. The black line shows the decoding
accuracy achieved when condition labels were randomly reshuffled.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085100.g008
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simple differences in degree of preparation between conditions,
perhaps due to the greater difficulty of free choices. The reaction
times to the Go stimulus offer an independent check of how
prepared participants were at the time of the Go signal. We found
a very small, and non-significant difference between reaction times
for free (M=0.274 s, SD=0.012 s) and instructed (M=0.267 s,
SD=0.017 s) conditions (t(5) = 1.37, pw0.22). This suggests that
the difference in decoding accuracy does not simply reflect the
level of preparation or alertness, but instead corresponds to some
more specific factor that differs between free and force choices,
such as the differential activation of the two cerebral hemispheres.
We also compared decoding for free choice trials where
participants decided to obey/follow or disobey/countermand the
direction cue. Figure 9 shows that both free-choice outcomes could
be decoded equally well. Furthermore, the reaction times for the
obey and disobey were almost identical (Obey
(M=0.266 s,SD=0.025): Disobey (M=0.267, SD=0.019):
t(5) =20.07, p~0.95), suggesting that the fact that they obeyed
or disobeyed the directional cue had no affect on the amount of
preparation or execution of the motor command.
Discussion
We have decoded human intentions to produce voluntary
actions at sensorimotor timescales, using a model trained on
repetitive execution and mental imagery. Importantly, the
resulting model offers significant benefits in decoding intentions
in a precued delayed-response task. In particular, our approach
provides a link between the literatures on continuous intention-
recognition in BCI applications, and the neuroscientific literature
on brain circuits for action preparation. To our knowledge, these
two approaches have not been directly integrated before. These
results demonstrate that the neural correlates of repetitive
executed and imagined movement are also present in the
preparation of action. This finding is consistent with the general
notion of ‘motor representation’ suggested by neuropsychological
theories [21], and points to action preparation as the common
element of all three tasks. Importantly, however, the timescales of
the three tasks studied here are quite different. We found that
models for repetitive execution and imagery were also successful in
decoding one-shot intentions in the rapid motor tasks used as
laboratory analogues of natural intentional action in the human
motor control literature. This result implies that neural codes for a
hemisphere-specific action are deployed throughout continuous
repetitive action, and that similar neural events occur during sub-
second phases of action preparation. We believe this is the first
application of BCI-related decoding to sensorimotor timescales of
the experimental motor control literature. Clearly, our result does
not mean that the neural timescales of both tasks are the same.
Rather, our data shows that the neural processes underlying both
tasks, notably m and b ERD/ERS, have similar spatial localisation
and modulation, and that these processes contribute to short-term
preparation for intentional action.
Importantly, our method allowed us to decode participant’s free
decisions regarding whether to make a left or right hand action.
The ability to decode volitional decisions is essential for usable
BCIs. In addition, accurate decoding of free decisions in real time
would allow a valuable methdological step in the scientific study of
intentional action. For example, participants in our study could be
presented with intention-contingent stimuli. A ‘‘STOP’’ signal
could be flashed up just before execution of an ‘undesirable’
action, for example. In previous voluntary action experiments,
participants freely chose between using the left or right hand [31].
In our implementation, this corresponded to either obeying/
following or disobeying/countermanding the directional precue.
This design was based on previous countermanding saccade
studies [32], but is formally equivalent to a binary choice between
action alternatives. Interestingly, the countermanding approach
allowed us to compare the strength of intention for the two
possible action choices. One might imagine that intentions are
Figure 9. ROC AUC of Obey vs Disobey under the Free condition. Aligned to Go cue using a 300 ms window. The black line shows the
decoding accuracy achieved when condition labels were randomly reshuffled.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085100.g009
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facilitated by following external cues, but are impaired when they
are in conflict with an external cue. In fact, we found no
discernible difference in strength of intention between choices to
obey and disobey. While this null result must be interpreted with
caution, particularly from a small study such as ours, we take this
as modest evidence that the intentions measured in our study arise
at a later processing stage than the stage of conflict resolution.
Indeed, conflict resolution for saccades has been linked to the
Supplementary Eye Field [32], while our CSP codes were focused
on the motor cortical regions contralateral to movement. In brief,
our result has the interesting implication that a conflict in the
initial choice of action does not impair the subsequent develop-
ment of intention.
A key finding of our study is that free-choice intentions are less
well decoded than instructed intentions. Since we interpret
decoding accuracy as a proxy for strength of intention, this
finding implies that free-choice decisions lead to weaker intentions
than instructed decisions. We found no difference in strength of
intention between obey and disobey choices (previous paragraph),
we interpret this result as a main effect of volition, rather than a
possible effect of conflict. More specifically, we found that free
choice intentions began no earlier than instructed intentions, but
had only reached a lower level of intention strength by the time of
the Go signal. We now discuss the latency and amplitude of free-
choice intentions, in turn. Importantly, decoding accuracy at the
time of the precue was low in free-choice decisions. This helps to
rule out the possibility that participants had merely predecided
before the trial which hand they would use, and entirely ignored
the precue. Predecision presents a major methodological difficulty
in studying voluntary action processes [33]. The methods used in
many volition experiments make predecision difficult to rule out.
We suggest that strength of intention revealed by decoding is a
useful measure to determine when decisions are made [34].
The time-course of decoding suggests that intentions in this
paradigm are clearly triggered by the cue, even in the free choice
condition. In much of the ‘‘free will’’ literature, the timescales are
much longer, and are up to the subject (e.g., Libet et al., 1983;
Soon et al., 2008). The a ‘‘free’’ choices made in our paradigm are
clearly likely to depend on prestimulus activity somewhere in the
brain. However, our method sought to maximise decoding
accuracy of these intentions from motor-related activity, and did
not involve a whole-brain search for earliest relevant information
[35].
The low final level of intention strength for free choices may be
problematic for BCI applications, but it is scientifically informative
about the processes of volition in the human brain. Why might
final strength of intention just before action be lower for free-
choice than for instructed actions? We suggest that internally-
generated decisions are relatively weakly held compared to
externally-instructed decisions. That is, voluntary actions are
always subject to ‘‘changing one’s mind’’. This gives voluntary
action its unique flexibility and unpredictability, which may confer
important evolutionary advantages. The low discriminative
strength of free-choice intentions may be linked to the notion
that an agent who makes a voluntary choice ‘‘could have done
otherwise’’ [36,37]. The notion that volitional choices are weak
and changeable relative to instructed choices has been suggested
before [17]. However, previous studies could only probe strength
of intention by imposing external ‘switch’ cues, and lacked a
naturalistic way to compare intention strength. Our method
provides the first direct evidence, to our knowledge, that free-
choice intentions differ in strength from instructed intentions.
Although we use BCI methods, our study departs from standard
BCI practice in a number of ways, consistent with our scientific
objectives. In particular, the arrangement of training and testing
data in our study differs from classical BCI. In most BCI settings,
the same task is used both to obtain the training data, and to test
the model. This crossvalidation approach allows BCI studies to
optimise decoding of intentions within that task. In contrast, our
method takes an established, plausible BCI paradigm, and
demonstrates transfer to a completely different task driven by
our scientific interests. Thus, training and testing tasks are
completely different. While we show good transfer from the
training task to the testing task, it seems likely that the transfer
involves some loss of decoding accuracy. Nevertheless, the set of
features present during our training is available at sensorimotor
time scales and is sensitive to cognitive parameters of natural
human action.
We end by acknowledging some limitations of our study. First,
the size of our study is relatively small, particularly for the
comparison between free and instructed choices. However, it is
comparable to other studies in the field [38,39]. The small sample
size means that particular caution is required in interpreting non-
significant results. For example, we found that free-choice actions
could be decoded slightly, but nonsignificantly, earlier after the
precue than instructed choice actions. A larger study might
identify this as a significant difference, so we hesitate to make
strong interpretations regarding this difference based on the
present evidence. Second, our results clearly do not generalise to
the population as a whole, as our sample is highly selective. In
particular, we excluded several individuals with poor EEG signals,
low amplitude sensorimotor rhythms, and poor decoding accura-
cy. Therefore, our conclusions can only apply to a selected
subgroup, and should not be taken as implying the general
viability of BCI at sensorimotor timescales. Third, we did not
include any strong motivation in our free-choice condition.
Participants were simply instructed to choose anew each time
the precue appeared, which hand to prepare for subsequent
action. In a richer conceptualisation of volition, as in most BCI
paradigms, participants should have a reason to make one action
rather than another.
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